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I. Introduction
 Unrequested solicitation is any solicitation performed by businesses one-sidedly, 
without any request for solicitation on the part of consumers 1）. The main reasons why it 
has been regarded as necessary to provide for a special treatment of such solicitation, is 
that it is conducted at residences or during personal times, which are originally not 
intended for business purposes; that such solicitation includes elements of surprise for 
consumers; and that on account of such characteristics, it can cause a nuisance to a large 
 ＊ Associate Professor, Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University.
 This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 15K16973.
 1） Makinori Goto, Wagakuni ni okeru Fushoseikanyukisei no Arikata [Current State of Affairs of the 
Regulation of Unrequested Solicitation in Japan], Gendaishohishaho, no.9 (2010), p.38.
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number of consumers.
 This paper deals with the issue of regulation of unrequested telephone and door-to-
door solicitation. In general, the debate regarding unrequested solicitation usually also 
includes e-mail solicitation (e-spamming), junk mail etc.2）. In this paper, such other aspects 
of unrequested solicitation will not be treated. The reason for this is that the main motive 
for	 this	 research	has	 been	 the	 recent	 developments	 in	 Japan	 in	 the	field	of	 telephone	 and	
door-to-door solicitation 3）. As will be described in detail later in this paper, there has 
recently	 been	 a	 large	 debate	 in	 Japan	 regarding	 these	 specific	 two	 types	 of	 unrequested	
solicitation in Japan, driven by the relevant legislative procedure, during which the 
possible introduction of new regulation systems for them has been considered. 
Unfortunately, mainly due to a strong opposition expressed by businesses, no such new 
regulation has been introduced. However, the author believes that it is of great importance 
to present and analyze the issue of these two types of regulation in Japan, in view of 
prospective future developments.
 The above-mentioned debate regarding telephone and door-to-door solicitation in 
Japan has mainly focused on the issue of introducing a system that would either prohibit 
in general telephone and door-to-door solicitation made without the consumer’s consent, or 
that would make it possible for consumers to comprehensively refuse ex ante. This debate 
has	 been	 strongly	 influenced	 by	 the	 existence	 of	 such	 systems	 abroad.	 Just	 to	 mention	
some recent developments in the Asian region, Singapore and Korea introduced a 
so-called Do-Not-Call system (an opt-out system that will be analyzed in Section II.1) in 
2014. Further, in Australia, court decisions delivered in 2013 have contributed to an 
enhancement of the regulation of door-to-door solicitation.
 The analysis in this paper will start by exploring telephone and door-to-door 
solicitation regulation abroad (Chapter II), in order to make clear the “international 
standards”	 of	 such	 regulation.	Next,	 the	 current	 state	 of	 affairs	 of	 regulation	 in	 Japan,	 as	
well as the issues and debate related to it will be presented (Chapter III). Subsequently, 
the relevant legislative procedure in Japan and its outcome will be treated (Chapter IV), 
followed by some brief closing remarks (Chapter V).
 2） Regarding the regulation of unrequested solicitation in Japan in general, see Yoshifumi Imagawa, 
Fushoseikanyukisei no Igi to Kadai [Significance and Issues of Regulation of Unrequested Solicitation], 
Kobegakuinhogaku,	vol.41,	no.2	(2011),	p.1	ff.,	Megumi	Uesugi,	Fushoseikanyukinshi o meguru Hotekikadai 
(1) (2) [Legal Issues Regarding the Prohibition of Unrequested Solicitation (1) (2)], Aichidaigakuhogakubu-
hokeironshu,	no.193	(2013),	p.1	ff,	no.198	(2014),	p.49	ff.
 3） Regarding such developments, the current state and issues of telephone and door-to-door regulation in 
Japan, see Ryosuke Morisada, Nihon no Fushoseikanyukisei to Tokuteishotorihikiho no Kaiseigiron 
[Regulation of Unrequested Solicitation and Debate on the Reform of the Act on Specified Commercial 
Transactions in Japan], Oike Library, no.43 (2016), p.41.
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II. International Trends
 In this chapter, a brief presentation of the regulation of unrequested solicitation in other 
countries will be made, so as to provide some comparative law material that will elucidate 
the	 insufficiency	 or	 need	 for	 improvement	 of	 the	 existing	 regulation	 in	 Japan.	 Section	 1	
will provide an overview of the two types of regulation (“opt-in” and “opt-out”), and 
Section 2 will present concrete examples of regulation in some countries.
1. Opt-in and Opt-out System
 By taking a look at the regulation of unrequested solicitations in several countries 
worldwide, it becomes clear that there are two main systems for providing consumers the 
opportunity	 to	 avoid	 such	 solicitations	 beforehand	 and	 comprehensively.	 The	 first	 is	
prohibiting solicitations, unless there has been a previous request or consent on the part of 
the person to be solicited (prohibition of unrequested solicitations; “opt-in” system). The 
second is allowing in principle unrequested solicitations, and providing to the persons to 
be solicited the ability to express their refusal against such solicitations beforehand and in 
a comprehensive manner (“opt-out” system)4）.
 As will be presented in Chapter III Section 1, there exists in Japan a legislative 
prohibition of re-solicitation for door-to-door and telephone solicitation. Such regulation 
belongs to the category of opt-out regulation, since re-solicitation is prohibited only when 
there	has	been	a	 refusal	on	 the	part	of	 the	consumer.	The	main	difference	(and	weakness)	
of this system compared to the Do-Not-Call and Do-Not-Knock systems in other countries 
(opt-out systems) is that the relevant provisions of the Japanese legislation allow only for 
a per-company-basis refusal (which has to be repeated for each new solicitation by a new 
company), whereas the Do-Not-Call and Do-Not-Knock systems abroad allow for a 
comprehensive	refusal	of	all	future	solicitations.	The	time-	and	effort-saving	effects	of	 the	
latter are quite obvious. Needless to say, the opt-in solution (general prohibition of 
unrequested solicitation without the consumer’s request or consent) provides for the 
highest level of protection.
2. Regulation in Foreign Countries
A. Telephone Solicitation 5）
 The usage of Do-Not-Call systems (opt-out systems) is widespread internationally. 
 4） In Japan, the terms “opt-in” and “opt-out” are used with the meaning explained in this paper. However, the 
usage	of	these	terms	may	differ	in	other	countries,	with	the	terms	being	used	with	the	contrary	meaning.	This	
has	to	do	with	a	difference	as	to	the	object	to	which	the	person	to	be	solicited	will	opt	“in”	or	“out.”	In	Japan,	
it is unrequested solicitation that is regarded as being such object. In countries where the terms have the 
contrary meaning, the object is the state where no unrequested solicitation is performed. In this paper, the 
terms will be used with the meaning they have in Japanese literature.
 5） Regarding the regulation of telephone solicitation in countries other than Japan see Shinji Minai and 
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Further, there also exist countries that have chosen to introduce a comprehensive 
prohibition of unrequested telephone solicitation (opt-in system). In the following, the 
outline of such regulation in countries other than Japan will be presented.
(i) The American Continent
- United States 6）: In the United States, a certain degree of regulation of unrequested 
telephone solicitation has been in existence since 1991, and a National Do Not Call 
Registry 7） has been in operation since 2003. The registry is operated by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and enforcement is carried out by the FTC, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) and the State Governments. Registration was initially 
valid	 for	 five	 years,	 but	 currently	 there	 is	 no	 expiration	 period.	 Political	 calls,	 charitable	
calls, debt collection calls, information calls, and telephone survey calls, as well as calls 
from parties with whom the registered person has recently done business or to whom the 
person has given written permission to call are exempted. Telemarketers bear the 
obligation to obtain copies of the registry, check their list of numbers to be solicited 
against	 them,	 and	 delete	 registered	 numbers.	Those	who	 violate	 the	 registry	 can	 be	fined	
up to 16,000 U.S. dollars. There were 217,855,659 registrations as of September 30, 2014. 
The system removes numbers automatically when they are disconnected and reassigned.
 It is worth noting here that the constitutionality of this system has been challenged at 
the time of its introduction. However, the Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. Federal 
Trade Commission decision (2004)8） has unanimously admitted the constitutionality of the 
registry.
Antonios Karaiskos, Shogaikoku ni okeru Do-Not-Call Seido to Nihonho e no Shisa – Denwakanyukyohitorokuseido 
no Donyu e no Giron ni mukete– [Do-Not-Call Systems in Foreign Countries and Lessons for Japanese 
Law: In Preparation of the Debate towards an Introduction of a Registration System for Refusals against 
Telephone Solicitation],	Gendaishohishaho	no.26	(2015),	p.80	ff.,	Shinji	Minai,	Nihon ni okeru Denwakanyukisei 
to Kongo no Tenbo [Regulation of Telephone Solicitation in Japan and Future Perspectives], Webuban 
Kokuminseikatsu,	no.45	(2015),	p.16	ff.
 6） Regarding the Do-Not-Call system of the U.S. see Antonios Karaiskos, Amerika no Do-Not-Call Seido [The 
Do-Not-Call System of the United States],	Webuban	Kokuminseikatsu,	no.36	(2015),	p.17	ff.,	Kenji	Saigusa,	
Denwakanyukisei – Zenbei Do-Not-Call Seido no Donyukanosei no Kento – [Regulation of Telephone 
Solicitation: A Study on the Possibility of Introduction of the Pan-American Do-Not-Call System], 
Kokuminseikatsukenkyu,	 vol.44,	 no.1	 (2001),	 p.13	 ff.	 (both	 in	 Japanese),	 as	well	 as	Kathleen	Ann	Ruane,	
Telemarketing Regulation: National and State Do Not Call Registries, Congressional Research Service 7-5700 
www.crs.gov R43684, Charles V. Gall and Margaret M. Stolar, Federal and State Telemarketing Developments, 
The	Business	Lawyer,	vol.59	(2004),	p.1241	ff.	(in	English).
 7） https://www.donotcall.gov/ (last visited September 30, 2016).
 8） Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir.), 543 U.S. 
812 (2004). Regarding this decision, see Hidetomo Sasaki, Comment on the Decision, Amerikaho no.2 (2006), 
p.365	ff.,	Osawa	Kenkyukai	 [Osawa	Study	Group],	Amerika ni okeru Eiritekigenron no Jiyu [The Freedom 
of Commercial Speech in the United States],	Seijigakukenkyu,	no.40	(2009),	p.157	ff.
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- Canada 9）: In Canada, a National Do Not Call List 10） has been operating from 2008. The 
list is operated by Bell Canada and enforced by Canada Radio-television and 
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC). There is no expiration period for registrations. 
Registered	 charities,	 political	 parties	 and	 candidates,	 opinion	 polling	 firms	 or	 market	
research	 firms	 conducting	 surveys,	 newspapers	 calling	 to	 sell	 a	 subscription,	 and	
organizations that have a business relationship with the person registered are exempted. If 
a telemarketer has violated the rules regarding the list, the CRTC may impose a penalty of 
up to 1,500 Canadian dollars per violation for individuals and up to 15,000 Canadian 
dollars per violation for corporations. The number of registrations was 12,239,563 as of 
March 31, 2014.
- Mexico 11）: In Mexico, a nationwide system has been operating since 2007, and was 
revised to the currently existing system called REPEP12） in 2012. The system is administered 
by PROFECO. In the beginning, the registrations were valid for three years, but currently 
there is no expiration period. Political parties, telephone surveys etc. are exempted. Each 
violation is sanctioned with a penalty of between 411 to 1,317,147 pesos. The number of 
registrations was 345,000 as of October 2015. One of the characteristics of this system is 
that the persons who register can choose among categories of businesses whose 
solicitation they wish to refuse.
- Brazil 13）: In Brazil, there is still no nationwide system, but systems within states or 
cities have been developed.
- Argentina 14）: In Argentina, the Registro National No Llame 15） has been operating since 
2015. It is administered by the PDP. Registrations are valid for two years, but are 
automatically renewed. Election campaigns, companies with existing contractual relations 
etc. are exempted. Violations are sanctioned with penalties of between 1,000 to 10,000 
pesos etc.
(ii) Europe
 Regarding the European countries that are member states of the European Union, 
unrequested telephone solicitation is regulated by EU directives. Art. 13 of e-privacy 
 9） Regarding the Do-Not-Call system of Canada see Michiyo Maeda, Kanada, Mekishiko no Do-Not-Call 
Seido [The Do-Not-Call Systems of Canada and Mexico],	Webuban	Kokuminseikatsu,	no.39	(2015),	p.16	ff.
10） https://www.lnnte-dncl.gc.ca/insnum-regnum-eng (last visited September 30, 2016).
11）	 Regarding	 the	Do-Not-Call	 system	 of	Mexico,	 see	Michiyo	Maeda	 (op.	 cit.	 at	 note	 9),	 p.17	 ff.	 Further,	
regarding the systems of Mexico, Argentine and Brazil, see Michiyo Maeda, Raten Amerika no Don’t-Call-
Registry – Mekishiko, Aruzenchin, Burajiru – [Don’t-Call-Registry in Latin America – Mexico, Argentina, 
Brazil],	Shohishahonyusu,	no.102	(2015),	p.188	ff.
12） http://rpc.profeco.gob.mx/index.jsp?menu=2 (last visited September 30, 2016).
13） Regarding the system of Brazil see Michiyo Maeda, Burajiru no Do-Not-Call Seido [The Do-Not-Call 
System of Brazil],	Webuban	Kokuminseikatsu,	no.40	(2015),	p.16	ff.
14） Regarding the Do-Not-Call system of Argentina, see Michiyo Maeda, Aruzenchin no Do-Not-Call 
Shisutemu [The Do-Not-Call System of Argentina],	Webuban	Kokuminseikatsu,	no.40	(2015),	p.17	ff.
15） http://www.nollame.gob.ar/ (last visited September 30, 2016).
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directive	 2002/58/EC	 as	 currently	 in	 effect,	 provides	 that	 member	 states	 shall	 take	
appropriate measures to ensure that unsolicited communications for the purposes of direct 
marketing, in cases other than the use of automated calling and communication systems 
without human intervention (automatic calling machines), facsimile machines (fax) or 
electronic mail 16）, are not allowed either without the consent of the subscribers or users 
concerned (opt-in system) or in respect of subscribers or users who do not wish to receive 
these communications (opt-out system); the choice between these options is determined by 
national legislation, taking into account that both options must be free of charge for the 
subscriber or user (para.3). This shall apply to subscribers who are natural persons, but 
member states shall also ensure that the legitimate interests of subscribers other than 
natural	 persons	 with	 regard	 to	 unsolicited	 communications	 are	 sufficiently	 protected	
(para.5).
 According to the above, EU member states are free to choose between an opt-in and 
an opt-out system. This has led to a variation in the regulation systems, with some 
countries adopting a nationwide opt-out system (U.K., France, Italy etc.), some having a 
voluntary opt-out system run by business organizations etc. (Switzerland, Sweden, Finland 
etc.) and others adopting an opt-in system that is stricter for businesses (Germany, Austria, 
Luxembourg etc.).
- United Kingdom 17）: In the U.K., a Telephone Preference Service has been operated by 
the	 Direct	 Marketing	 Association	 since	 1996,	 and	 has	 become	 a	 nationwide	 official	
system 18）	since	1999.	The	service	 is	supervised	by	the	Information	Commissioner’s	Office	
(ICO). There is no expiration period for registrations. The remit of the system lies strictly 
within the boundaries of live unsolicited calls of a sales/marketing nature, and it does not 
stop other call types such as recorded/automated messages, silent calls, market research, 
overseas companies, debt collection, scam calls, nuisance and abusive calls etc. Violations 
are	 sanctioned	 with	 fines	 of	 up	 to	 500,000	 ponds.	As	 of	 July	 2015,	 there	 were	 around	
21,000,000 registrations. It is noteworthy that there also exists a system for registration of 
16） The use of these for the purposes of direct marketing may be allowed only in respect of subscribers or 
users who have given their prior consent (opt-in system).
17） Regarding the Do-Not-Call system of the U.K., see Megumi Uesugi, Igirisu de no Cold Calls ni kansuru 
Genjo [The Present State of Cold Calls in the United Kingdom],	 Shohishahonyusu,	 no.106	 (2016)	 p.42	 ff,	
Megumi Uesugi, Igirisu no Nuisance Calls e no Torikumi [Initiatives against Nuisance Calls in the United 
Kingdom],	 Aichi	 Daigaku	 Hogakubu	 Hokeironshu,	 no.204	 (2015)	 p.229	 ff.,	 Megumi	 Uesugi,	 Igirisu no 
Do-Not-Call Seido [The Do-Not-Call System of the United Kingdom], Webuban Kokuminseikatsu, no.36 
(2015),	p.16	ff.,	Megumi	Uesugi,	Tokuteishotorihikiho ni okeru Fushoseikanyu no Kisei no Arikata [The Way 
of Being of the Regulation of Unrequested Solicitation in the Act on Specified Commercial Transactions], 
Gendaishohishaho,	 no.27	 (2015),	 p.35	 ff.,	Megumi	Uesugi,	 Igirisu ni okeru Dairekuto Maketingu no Kisei 
[Regulation of Direct Marketing in the United Kingdom], Aichi Daigaku Hogakubu Hokeironshu, no.201 
(2014)	 p.1	 ff.,	 Megumi	 Uesugi,	 Igirisu ni okeru Fushoseikanyu no kisei [Regulation of Unrequested 
Solicitation in the United Kingdom],	Shohishahonyusu,	no.91	(2012),	p.161	ff.
18） http://www.tpsonline.org.uk/tps/whatistps.html (last visited September 30, 2016).
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corporate numbers, the Corporate Telephone Preference Service (CTPS).
- France 19）: In France, the new nationwide Bloctel started operating from June 2016. Its 
operation has been assigned to Opposetel, a company composed of four telemarketing 
companies, and enforcement is carried out by the DGCCRF. Registration is valid for three 
years. Solicitations by companies with existing transaction relations, solicitations for 
newspapers, magazines etc. are exempted. Violations are sanctioned with an administrative 
penalty of a maximum of 15,000 euros for individuals and 75,000 euros for legal entities. 
The number of persons registered already exceeded 1,000,000 as of June 2, 2016. The 
method used for verifying whether a certain number is registered, is that of “washing,” 
which means that telemarketers “wash” their list of prospective telephone numbers to be 
solicited against the registry 20）. This means that the telemarketer submits a list of the 
prospective persons to be solicited, and the operator sends back the list with the numbers 
registered in the system deleted. In general, this system provides for a higher level of 
protection, compared to systems like the ones in the U.S. and other countries where 
businesses obtain copies of the registry 21）.
- Italy 22）: In Italy, the Registro Pubblico delle Opposizioni 23） was introduced in 2011. Its 
operation has been assigned to the Fondazione Ugo Bordoni by the Ministry of Economic 
Development – Department of Communications through a service agreement. There is no 
expiration period for registrations, and the sanctions for violations are stipulated in the 
Personal Data Protection Code. As of October 2015, there were 1,421,939 persons 
registered. Legal entities can also register their numbers. The registry is automatically 
updated, and numbers whose holders have changed or which are not any more in use are 
deleted.	The	method	used	for	verification	is	that	of	“washing.”
- Norway 24）: In Norway, the Reservasjonsregisteret has been operated since 2001, by a 
19） Regarding the Do-Not-Call system of France, see Antonios Karaiskos, Furansu no Do-Not-Call Seido 
“Burokuteru (Bloctel)” no Unyokaishi [Commencement of Operation of the Do-Not-Call System “Bloctel” in 
France],	Shohishahonyusu,	no.108	 (2016),	p.151	ff.,	Antonios	Karaiskos,	Furansu no Aratana Do-Not-Call 
Seido ga Shido [The New Do-Not-Call System of France Started Operating], Webuban Kokuminseikatsu, 
no.48 (2016) p.19, Antonios Karaiskos, Furansu no Do-Not-Call Seido [The Do-Not-Call System of France], 
Webuban	Kokuminseikatsu,	no.41	(2015),	p.15	ff.
20）	 Regarding	 the	 existing	 verification	 methods,	 see	 Masashi	 Okamoto,	 Naoyuki	 Nishizuka	 and	 Hirokazu	
Sawada, Denwakanyukyohitorokuseido ni okeru Shogohoshiki – Osutoraria/Shingaporu no Chosa o Fumaete 
– [Verification Methods for Telephone Solicitation Refusal Systems: Based on the Research Trip to Australia/
Singapore],	Shohishahonyusu,	no.41	(2015),	p.156	ff.
21） In Japan, it is pointed out that this entails the danger of misuse of such copies, since they include the 
telephone numbers of persons who can be in general assumed to be “vulnerable” (in the sense that they are 
comparatively not able to strongly resist unrequested solicitation). Regarding this issue, see Shinji Minai and 
Antonios Karaiskos (op. cit. at note 5), p.86.
22） Regarding the Do-Not-Call system of Italy, see Antonios Karaiskos, Itaria no Do-Not-Call Seido [The 
Do-Not-Call System of Italy],	Webuban	Kokuminseikatsu,	no.41	(2015),	p.17	ff.
23） http://www.registrodelleopposizioni.it/ (last visited September 30, 2016).
24） Regarding the Do-Not-Call system of Norway, see Antonios Karaiskos, Noruwe no Do-Not-Call Seido [The 
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government registration organization called Brønnøysundregistrene. There is no expiration 
period for registrations. Companies with whom there exists a customer relationship are 
exempted, as long as the objective of the telephone solicitation is the goods or services 
that formed the basis of such relationship. When registering, it is possible to exempt 
telephone solicitations for charities. According to the annual report of 201425）, there were 
2,110,675 registrations at the point of time of preparation of the report.
- The Netherlands 26）: In the Netherlands, a voluntary registry was being operated by 
Stichtung	 Infofilter,	 and	 in	 2009,	 a	 nationwide	 official	 registry	 called	 Bel-me-niet	
Register 27） was introduced, operated by the same organization. There is no expiration 
period for registrations. Companies with whom there is a customer relationship, market 
research calls etc. are exempted. Sanctions against violations are imposed by the 
Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets. As of April 2013, the number of 
registrations was around 8,000,000. Apart from natural persons, some types of legal 
entities can also register their numbers. When registering, it is possible to choose to refuse 
from among ten business categories of telephone solicitation. It is noteworthy that 
telephone solicitation having as its purpose the transmission of thoughts or charity is also 
subject to refusal.
- Belgium 28）: In Belgium, a voluntary Robinson List 29） had been operated by the Belgian 
Direct	Marketing	Association	(BDMA),	and	in	March	2013	the	nationwide	official	list	“Ne	
m’appelez plus” 30） was introduced. The list is operated by the non-lucrative organization 
DNCM (which stands for “Do Not Call Me”), established by BDMA. Registrations were 
originally valid for two years, but there is currently no expiration period. Sanctions against 
violations are imposed by the Ministry of Finance. As of October 2015, there were 
723,633 registrations. It is worth mentioning that the Belgian system allows for refusal of 
telephone solicitations even when there is an existing customer relationship. Further, legal 
entities can also register their numbers, and telephone numbers that are no longer in use 
etc. are automatically deleted from the list.
Do-Not-Call System of Norway],	Webuban	Kokuminseikatsu,	no.42	(2016),	p.16	ff.
25） The annual report (in Norwegian), can be downloaded from the website of Brønnøysundregistrene, http://
www.nsd.uib.no/polsys/data/en/forvaltning/enhet/13514/aarsmelding (last visited September 30, 2016).
26） Regarding the Do-Not-call system of the Netherlands, see Antonios Karaiskos, Oranda no Do-Not-Call 
Seido [The Do-Not-Call System of the Netherlands],	Webuban	Kokuminseikatsu,	no.32	(2016),	p.17	ff.
27） https://www.bel-me-niet.nl/ (last visited September 30, 2016).
28） Regarding the Do-Not-Call system of Belgium, see Antonios Karaiskos, Berugi no Do-Not-Call Seido [The 
Do-Not-Call System of Belgium],	Webuban	Kokuminseikatsu,	no.43	(2016),	p.16	ff.
29） Robinson Lists are lists that enable the persons registered on them to avoid solicitation by means of 
telephone, door-to-door visits, facsimile, post mail, e-mail etc. The reason why such lists are so named seems 
to be that they allow registered persons to spend their lives in tranquility and undisturbed, just like Robinson 
Crusoe did on his island.
30） https://www.ne-m-appelez-plus.be/ (last visited September 30, 2016).
29
Regulation of Unrequested Solicitation in Japan:  
The Way Toward a Do-Not-Call and Do-Not-Knock System?
- Spain 31）: In Spain, a Robinson List 32） has being functioning since 2009. It is operated by 
ADIGITAL, an organization formed by businesses. Enforcement is carried out by the Data 
Protection Authority. There is no expiration period for registrations. Violations are 
sanctioned with penalties of between 40,001 to 300,000 euros. According to the White 
Paper for the year 2015, the number of persons registered at the time of preparation of the 
paper was 400,00033）.
- Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, and Portugal have lists operated by business 
organizations. These lists are not compulsory like the ones mentioned above, but 
voluntary. This means that only businesses that are members of the relevant organizations 
are bound by such lists.
- Germany, Austria, Luxembourg, and Denmark have adopted an opt-in system, where 
unrequested telephone solicitation is allowed only in cases where the person to be 
solicited has previously given its consent to such solicitation. It should be mentioned here 
that although Denmark in principle adopts an opt-in system, there exist at the same time 
some categories of unrequested telephone solicitation that are exempted and allowed, 
namely (i) ordering of books; (ii) subscriptions for newspapers, magazines, and 
periodicals; (iii) brokering of insurance contracts etc.; and (iv) subscriptions for rescue 
services or medical transport 34）. However, an opt-out list is available for persons who wish 
to refuse such solicitations too 35）.
(iii) Oceania/Asia
- Australia 36）: In Australia, a Do-Not-Call Register 37） exists since 2007. Before this 
register came into force, there existed a voluntary register run by a business organization, 
as well as regulations within states. Enforcement is performed by the Australian 
31） Regarding the Do-Not-Call system of Spain, see Michiyo Maeda, Supein no Do-Not-Call Seido [The 
Do-Not-Call System of Spain],	Webuban	Kokuminseikatsu,	no.44	(2016),	p.17	ff.
32） https://www.listarobinson.es/ (last visited September 30, 2016).
33） Michiyo Maeda (op. cit. at note 31), p.18.
34） Art. 4 para. 2 of the Danish Consumer Contracts Act, available (in English translation) at www.
consumereurope.dk/Menu/Consumer-laws/Danish-laws/The-Danish-Consumer-Contracts-Act (last visited 
September 30, 2016).
35） Art. 6, para. 3 of the Consolidated Marketing Practices Act, available (in English translation) at http://www.
consumerombudsman.dk/~/media/Consumerombudsman/dco/Markedsfoeringsloven%20lbkg%202013.pdf 
(last visited September 30, 2016).
36） Regarding the Do-Not-Call system of Australia, see Gensei Ohama, Osutoraria no Do-Not-Call Seido [The 
Do-Not-Call System of Australia],	Webuban	Kokuminseikatsu,	 no.37	 (2015),	 p.15	ff.	Further,	 regarding	 the	
systems of Australia and Singapore, see Kinkibengoshikairengokai [Kinki Federation of Bar Associations], 
Osutoraria/Shingaporu ni okeru Do Not Call Register no Unyojokyo ni kansuru Chosahokokusho [Research 
Report on the Operational Status of the Do Not Call Register in Australia and Singapore], 2015 (the author 
of this paper participated in this research as coordinator and interpreter), as well as Akira Hasegawa/Kozo 
Nagano/Gensei Ohama, Osutoraria/Shingaporu no Do Not Call Seido Chosahokokusho [Research Report on 
the Do-Not-Call System in Australia/Singapore],	Shohishahonyusu,	no.104	(2015),	p.152	ff.
37） https://www.donotcall.gov.au/ (last visited September 30, 2016).
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Communications and Media Authority (ACMA). Registrations were at the beginning valid 
for three years, but now there is no expiration period. Exceptions from the prohibition are 
allowed for certain public interest organizations, such as charities, educational institutions, 
social researchers, opinion pollsters, and government bodies to make specific 
telemarketing calls. The amount payable in case of an infringement notice ranges up to 
110,000 Australian dollars for each day on which contraventions occurred, and penalties as 
a result of court action range up to 220,000 Australian dollars for each day on which 
infringements occurred. There were 10,000,000 registrations as of February 2015. The 
businesses check their lists by “washing” them against the register.
- India: In India, the National Call Preference Register (NCPR)38） has been operating since 
2011. It is a revised version of the National Do Not Call Registry (NDNC) introduced in 
2007. The register is administered by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). 
There is no expiration period for registrations. Violations are sanctioned with penalties 
whose amount increases according to the number of violations.
- Singapore 39）: In Singapore, a Do Not Call Registry 40） has been operated since 2014. 
Before, there was a voluntary registry operated by the Direct Marketing Association. The 
registry is operated and enforced by the Personal Data Protection Commission (PDPC). 
There is no expiration period for registrations. Charity calls, market researches etc. are 
exempted. Violations are sanctioned with penalties of a maximum of 10,000 Singapore 
dollars. As of July 2015, there were 821,000 registrations. The businesses check their lists 
by “washing” them against the registry.
- Korea 41）: In Korea, a system for registration of refusals 42） has been operated since 2014. 
The system is enforced by the Fair Trade Commission (local authorities are also granted 
some enforcement competences). Political parties, solicitation of insurance transactions etc. 
are exempted. Violations are sanctioned with a maximum of 10,000,000 South Korean 
won.	Characteristic	 to	 the	 system	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 allows	 refusal	 per	 business	field.	The	
checking of telemarketers’ lists is done by a “washing.”
B. Door-to-Door Solicitation
- Australia 43）: In Australia, public authorities, including the Australian Competition and 
38） http://www.nccptrai.gov.in/nccpregistry/ (last visited September 30, 2016).
39） Regarding the Do-Not-Call system of Singapore, see Akira Hasegawa, Shingaporu no Do-Not-Call Seido 
[The Do-Not-Call System of Singapore],	Webuban	Kokuminseikatsu,	no.38	(2015),	p.15	ff.
40） https://www.dnc.gov.sg/index.html (last visited September 30, 2016).
41） Regarding the Do-Not-Call system of Korea, see Yasuhiro Yoshioka, Kankoku no Do-Not-Call Seido [The 
Do-Not-Call System of Korea],	Webuban	Kokuminseikatsu,	no.38	(2015),	p.16	ff.
42） https://www.donotcall.go.kr/teldeny/TouchEnKey/install.do (last visited September 30, 2016).
43） Regarding the Do-Not-Knock system of Australia, see Gensei Ohama, Osutoraria no Do-Not-Knock Seido 
[The Do-Not-Knock System of Australia],	Webuban	Kokuminseikatsu,	 no.46	 (2016),	 p.17	 ff.,	 Shinji	Minai,	
Osutoraria no Do-Not-Knock Sutekka – Homonhanbaikanyu ni taisuru Jizenkyohi no Shien – [The Do-Not-
Knock Sticker of Australia: Assistance of Ex Ante Refusal Against Door-to-Door Solicitation], Shohishahonyusu, 
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Consumer Commission (ACCC) have been creating and distributing Do-Not-Knock 
stickers. The Federal Supreme Court of Australia has, in two recent decisions, admitted 
the	 legal	 effect	 of	 such	 stickers,	 in	 connection	 with	 Art.	 75,	 para.	 1	 of	 the	 Australian	
Consumer Law (ACL). According to the same provision, a dealer who calls on a person at 
any premises for the purpose of negotiating an unsolicited consumer agreement, or for an 
incidental or related purpose, must leave the premises immediately on the request of the 
occupier of the premises, or any person acting with the actual or apparent authority of the 
occupier; or the person with whom the negotiations are being conducted.
	 In	a	case,	which	occurred	in	South	Australia	in	November	2011,	a	sign	was	affixed	to	
the	consumer’s	front	door	and	contained	an	image	of	a	fist	knocking	with	a	line	through	it	
and the words “DO NOT KNOCK Unsolicited door-to-door selling not welcome here.” 
The Federal Court found, in its decision of October 13, 201344）, that AGL South Australia 
Pty Ltd and its marketing company, CPM Australia Pty Ltd, broke the law when their 
salesperson attempted to negotiate an agreement despite the presence of this sign on the 
consumer’s	 front	 door.	 This	 court	 decision	 confirmed	 that	 consumers	 can	 use	 a	 sign	 to	
request uninvited salespeople to leave their premises and do not need to meet the 
salesperson face-to-face to ask them to leave 45）.
 Further, in its decision of December 12, 201346）, the court ordered AGL SA and CPM 
to pay a pecuniary penalty of 35,000 and 25,000 Australian dollars respectively.
- United States 47）: In the U.S., contrary to the already mentioned Do-Not-Call system of 
the same country, there is no nationwide system, and regulation is performed on a state 
basis. Various methods are used for such regulation, with the main ones being the 
following: (1) obligation of solicitors to perform registrations or obtain licenses, (2) 
restrictions regarding the time and/or place etc. where solicitations are allowed, (3) 
Do-Not-Knock systems (opt-out systems), where the will to refuse solicitation is 
expressed with stickers, registries or a combination of them, and (4) general prohibition of 
no.99	(2014),	p.99	ff.
44） Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v AGL Sales Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1030 (11 October 
2013).
45） Regarding this decision, see for example the media release on the website of ACCC, https://www.accc.gov.
au/media-release/court-confirms-salespeople-must-not-ignore-%E2%80%98do-not-knock%E2%80%99-signs	
(last visited September 30, 2016).
46） Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v AGL Sales Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 1360 (12 
December 2013).
47） Regarding the Do-Not-Knock system of the U.S., see Antonios Karaiskos, Amerika no Do-Not-Knock Seido 
[The Do-Not-Knock System of the United States],	Webuban	Kokuminseikatsu,	no.46	 (2016),	p.18	ff.,	Shinji	
Minai, Amerika no Chihojichitai ni okeru Homonhanbaikisei – No Soliciting Sutekka to Kanyujyorei – 
[Regulation of Door-to-Door Solicitation in Local Authorities of the United States: No Soliciting Stickers and 
Solicitation Ordinances],	 Shohishahonyusu,	 no.100	 (2014),	 p.197	 ff.,	 Masato	 Yamada,	 Shohisha no 
Jinkakuken to Homonhanbai to no Kankei – Beikoku no Jitsurei o Sanko ni – [The Relation Between Personal 
Rights of Consumers and Door-to-Door Solicitation: Using Examples in the United States as a Reference], 
Gendaishoshishaho,	no.30	(2016),	p.70	ff.
32
KANSAI UNIV REV. L. & POL.  No. 38, MAR 2017
door-to-door solicitation (opt-in system), regarding either only commercial solicitation or 
solicitation in general.
 The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly admitted the right to have one’s 
refusal against door-to-door solicitation observed 48）. The validity of restrictions falling 
under the above-mentioned categories by ordinances of local authorities has often been 
argued in lawsuits. An overview of the relevant court decisions creates the following 
impressions. In general, American courts seem not to be admitting the validity of general 
prohibitions against door-to-door solicitations performed by charity or religious 
organizations, in the light of the protection of freedom of speech and religion. 
Respectively, local authorities seem to be avoiding the stipulating of such restrictions. 
Further, courts seem to be refusing the validity of extensively wide restrictions, admitting 
only reasonable restrictions. The constitutionality of provisions stipulating a general 
prohibition on unrequested door-to-door solicitation has been admitted by the Supreme 
Court 49）. However, this decision has been delivered at a time when freedom of commercial 
speech was not thought to be included in the scope of the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. This decision has been followed by lower court decisions denying the 
validity of such a general prohibition. There is also a Supreme Court Decision 50）, which 
denied the constitutionality of an ordinance that made registering and obtaining licenses 
compulsory for all door-to-door solicitation, including religious solicitation as well as 
pamphleteering.
 Consequently, it could be said that American courts show a tendency to judge that 
systems where the decision of refusing or not unrequested door-to-door solicitation is left 
to each individual, namely opt-out systems, are the most reasonable.
- Luxembourg 51）: In Luxembourg, the Consumer Code (Code de la Consommation) 
includes a special article regarding stickers etc. against door-to-door solicitation. More 
specifically,	Art.	L.222-8	stipulates	 that	all	contracts	concluded	as	a	result	of	door-to-door	
solicitation in violation of a refusal of such solicitation expressed by means of stickers etc. 
are void (para. 1). Violations of such wishes are sanctioned with a penalty between 251 to 
120,000	euros	(para.	2).	Although	there	is	no	specific	format	for	stickers	or	other	means	of	
expression of refusal, the government of Luxembourg has prepared and is delivering 
48）	 For	 example,	 in	Rowan	 v.	 Post	Office	Dept.,	 397	U.S.	728	 (1970),	 the	 Supreme	Court	 judged	 that	 “The	
Court has traditionally respected the right of a householder to bar, by order or notice, solicitors, hawkers, and 
peddlers from his property.”
49） Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
50） Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N. Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
51） Regarding the Do-Not-Knock system of Luxembourg, see Antonios Karaiskos, Rukusenburuku no Do-Not-
Knock Seido [The Do-Not-Knock System of Luxembourg],	Webuban	Kokuminseikatsu,	no.47	(2016),	p.18	ff.,	
Antonios Karaiskos, Rukusenburuku ni okeru Homonhanbai no Kisei – Homonhanbai Okotowari Sutekka o 
Chushin ni – [Regulation of Door-to-Door Solicitation in Luxembourg: Focusing on Do-Not-Knock Stickers], 
Shohishahonyusu,	no.101	(2014),	p.91	ff.
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stickers for this purpose free of charge.
- United Kingdom 52）: In the U.K., just as in the U.S., there is no nationwide system 
regulating door-to-door solicitation. Many local authorities are delivering Do-Not-Knock 
stickers. Further, there are local authorities with so-called “No Cold Calling Zones” or 
“Cold Calling Control Zones,” which are set to prevent cold calling and reduce the risk of 
doorstep crime. Such zones do not create exclusion zones, but can be useful in deterring 
unscrupulous	 cold	 callers.	 Zones	 do	 not	 automatically	 make	 it	 a	 criminal	 offence	 for	
unwanted doorstep sellers to call at someone’s door. However, since 2008, there is 
legislation	 that	 makes	 it	 an	 offence	 for	 any	 trader	 calling	 at	 doors	 to	 sell	 goods	 or	
services, to refuse a request to leave and/or return later. According to some local 
authorities, window or door stickers displaying such a request to cold callers are classed 
as a request to leave and not to call at the property 53）.
 There also exists the “nominated neighbour scheme,” which is designed to let a trusted 
neighbor, relative, or friend help an elderly or vulnerable person to deal with unexpected 
or unrecognized callers at their door.
- Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 54）: it should be noted here, that regarding door-
to-door solicitation (as well as telephone solicitation), the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive 2005/29/EC also includes important provisions. According to Annex I, 
conducting personal visits to a consumer’s home, ignoring the consumer’s request to leave 
or	not	 to	 return	except	 in	circumstances	and	 to	 the	extent	 justified,	under	national	 law,	 to	
enforce a contractual obligation, is an aggressive commercial practice (para. 1). Further, 
the same applies to making persistent and unwanted solicitations by telephone, fax, e-mail 
or	 other	 remote	media	 except	 in	 circumstances	 and	 to	 the	 extent	 justified	 under	 national	
law to enforce a contractual obligation (para. 2).
III. Regulation in Japan
 The presentation of the systems abroad has given a picture of the international 
standards and trends of the regulation of unrequested telephone and door-to-door 
solicitation.	 In	 the	 following,	 the	 current	 state	 of	 affairs	 of	 such	 regulation	 under	 the	
current legislation (Section 1) as well as by other means (Section 2) in Japan will be 
52） Regarding the Do-Not-Knock system of the U.K., see Megumi Uesugi, Igirisu no Do-Not-Knock Seido [The 
Do-Not-Knock System of the U.K.],	Webuban	Kokuminseikatsu,	no.47	(2016),	p.17	ff.,	Megumi	Uesugi	(op.	
cit.	at	note	2),	p.32	ff.
53） See for example the website of Wales,
 http://www.tradingstandardswales.org.uk/help/nocoldcalling.cfm (last visited September 30, 2016).
54） Regarding the content of the directive and its implementation in member states, see Shinji Minai, 
Fukoseitorihikihohoshirei to Kameikoku no Taio – UCPD o Manabu Koto de Mietekuru Koto – [Directive on 
Unfair Commercial Practices and Implementation in Member States: Lessons to be Learned by Analyzing the 
UCPD],	Shohishahonyusu,	no.108	(2016),	p.242	ff.
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presented.	This	will	make	clear	the	deficiency	and	the	issues	of	the	current	state	of	affairs	
of regulation in the same country (Section 3).
1. Legislative Regulation
A. Acts
 The main acts dealing with the issue of regulation of unrequested door-to-door and 
telephone	 solicitation	 in	 Japan	 are	 as	 follows.	 The	 Act	 on	 Specified	 Commercial	
Transactions, which covers seven transaction types (transactions arising from door-to-door 
sales, mail order sales, telemarketing sales, multilevel marketing transactions, transactions 
arising	 from	 the	 provision	 of	 specified	 continuous	 services,	 business	 opportunity	 sales	
transactions,	and	door-to-door	purchases)	offers	protection	with	 regard	 to	 those	categories	
of telephone and door-to-door transactions that are included in its scope.
 Among transactions that do not fall within its scope, the most problematic from the 
viewpoint of severe consumer damage occurring as a result of unrequested solicitation 
have	 been	 those	 of	 financial	 and	 commodity	 derivatives 55）. Therefore, unrequested 
solicitation regarding these types of transactions has been especially prohibited (with some 
exceptions, however) by the relevant special acts, as mentioned below. However, it must 
be emphasized that no regulation is included in any act regarding other transactions that 
do not fall under the scopes of the acts presented below. This means that under the 
existing legislation, consumers in Japan are not granted the right to refuse unrequested 
solicitation,	except	for	such	specific	transaction	types.
(i)	 Act	on	Specified	Commercial	Transactions 56）
 The purpose of this Act is to protect the interests of purchasers and others, and cause 
the distribution of goods and provision of services to be appropriate and smooth by 
ensuring fairness in transactions falling under its scope, and preventing damages that may 
be caused to the purchasers and others so as to contribute to the sound development of the 
national economy (Art. 1)57）.
 Regarding telephone solicitations, Art. 17 of the Act provides that no seller or service 
provider shall solicit a sales contract or a service contract through telemarketing sales 
from a person who has manifested the intention not to conclude such a contract. Further, 
regarding door-to-door solicitations, Art. 3-2, para. 2 of the Act provides that no seller or 
service provider shall solicit the conclusion of a sales contract or a service contract 
through door-to-door sales from a person who has manifested the intention not to 
conclude such a contract.
 The above-mentioned provisions do not apply to all telephone and door-to-door 
55） Shinji Minai (op. cit. at note 5) p.17.
56） Act No.57 of June 4, 1976.
57） All English translations of Japanese acts in this paper are based on the Japanese Law Translation Website 
(Japanese Law Translation Database System), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/?re=02 (last visited 
September 30, 2016), prepared by the Ministry of Justice, with minor adjustments where considered necessary.
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solicitations. According to Art. 26, para. 1 (viii) of the Act, certain sales or provision of 
services prescribed in the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, the Building Lots and 
Buildings Transaction Business Act, the Act on Provision, etc. of Trust Businesses by 
Financial Institutions, the Travel Agency Act etc., are not included in the scope of the 
above-mentioned provisions.
 Moreover, in light of the large increase in consumer damage caused by forced buying 
of noble metals etc., a provision prohibiting unrequested solicitation regarding door-to-
door purchases was also introduced with the amendment of the Act in 2012 (Art. 58-6).
	 The	 above-mentioned	 provision	 of	 Art.	3-2,	 para.	2	 of	 the	 Act	 on	 Specified	
Commercial Transactions, which prohibits door-to-door solicitation of persons who have 
made clear their intention not to conclude a contract, provides for a prohibition of 
re-solicitation. From the wording of this provision, one could suggest that its scope also 
includes cases where such a refusal has been made clear in advance by use of paper, 
stickers, or any other indication mentioning such a refusal, e.g. using the wording “No 
Solicitation.”
	 However,	 according	 to	 the	 “Guideline	 on	 Article	 3-2	 etc.	 of	 the	 Act	 on	 Specified	
Commercial	Transactions”	issued	by	the	Consumer	Affairs	Agency 58）, the manifestation of 
the intention not to conclude such a contract needs to be a refusal expressed against each 
individual solicitation. According to this understanding, the scope of this provision is 
restricted to cases where the consumer has expressed its will not to receive solicitation, 
after such solicitation has in fact started. This means that paper, stickers, or any other 
indication	 mentioning	 such	 a	 refusal	 is	 not	 considered	 to	 fulfill	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	
above-mentioned provision, since the object, content etc. of such refusal are not clear. The 
same interpretation is included in the explanation of this provision provided by the 
Consumer	Affairs	Agency 59）.
 It should also be mentioned here that, regarding solicitation via e-mail, Art. 12-3, para. 
1 of the Act stipulates that neither a seller nor a service provider shall in principle 
advertise via e-mail with regard to the terms and conditions under which it sells goods or 
designated rights or provides services through mail order sales, without the consent of the 
advertising target (opt-in system). Previously, an opt-out system was adopted for the 
regulation of unrequested e-mail solicitation, but this was changed to the current system in 
2007	due	to	the	lack	of	effectiveness	of	the	previous	one 60）.
58）	 The	Guideline	(in	Japanese)	can	be	found	on	the	website	of	the	Consumer	Affairs	Agency,	http://www.caa.
go.jp/trade/pdf/130220legal_4.pdf (last visited September 30, 2016).
59）	 Shohishacho	 Torihikitaisakuka	 [Consumer	 Affairs	 Agency,	 Consumer	 Transaction	 Division]	 and	
Keizaisangyosho Shomuryutsuhoangurupu Shohikeizaikikakushitsu [Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 
Commerce,	Distribution	and	Industrial	Safety	Policy	Group,	Consumer	Affairs	Policy	Planning	Office]	(eds.),	
Tokuteishotorihiki ni kansuru Horitsu no Kaisetsu [Explanation of the Act on Specified Commercial 
Transactions], (Tokyo: Shojihomu 2014), p.60.
60） Megumi Uesugi, Tokuteishotorihikiho ni okeru Fushoseikanyu no Kisei no Arikata [The Way of Being of 
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(ii) Financial Instruments and Exchange Act 61）
 The purpose of this Act is to ensure fairness in the issuance of securities and 
transactions	 of	 financial	 instruments,	 etc.	 and	 to	 facilitate	 the	 smooth	 distribution	 of	
securities,	as	well	as	to	achieve	fair	price	formation	for	financial	instruments,	etc.	 through	
the full utilization of the functions of the capital markets, by streamlining systems for the 
disclosure	 of	 corporate	 affairs,	 specifying	 the	 necessary	 particulars	 relevant	 to	 persons	
conducting	 financial	 instruments	 business,	 and	 ensuring	 the	 appropriate	 operation	 of	
financial	 instruments	 exchanges,	 thereby	 contributing	 to	 the	 sound	 development	 of	 the	
national economy and the protection of investors (Art. 1).
	 According	 to	Art.	 38,	 (iv)	 and	 (v)	of	 the	Act,	 it	 is	prohibited	 for	 a	financial	 services	
provider,	 etc.	 or	 the	 officer	 or	 employee	 thereof	 to	 engage	 in	 any	 of	 the	 following	 acts;	
provided,	however,	 that	 this	 excludes	acts	 that	 are	 specified	by	a	 cabinet	office	ordinance	
as	 being	 unlikely	 to	 result	 in	 insufficient	 investor	 protection,	 harm	 the	 fairness	 of	
transactions,	 or	 cause	 a	 loss	 of	 confidence	 in	 the	 financial	 instruments	 business:	 (iv)	
visiting or telephoning a customer that is not asking to be solicited for the conclusion of a 
financial	 instruments	 transaction	contract	 (limited	 to	one	 that	 is	specified	by	cabinet	order	
in	 consideration	 of	 the	 content	 of	 the	financial	 instruments	 transaction	 contract	 and	 other	
circumstances, as a contract in connection with which it is particularly necessary to ensure 
the	 protection	 of	 investors),	 and	 soliciting	 such	 a	 customer	 to	 conclude	 a	 financial	
instruments	 transaction	 contract;	 (v)	 soliciting	 a	 customer	 to	 conclude	 a	 financial	
instruments	 transaction	 contract	 (limited	 to	 one	 that	 is	 specified	 by	 cabinet	 order	 in	
consideration	 of	 the	 contents	 of	 the	 financial	 instruments	 transaction	 contract	 and	 other	
circumstances, as a contract in connection with which it is necessary to ensure the 
protection	 of	 investors)	 without	 obtaining	 confirmation	 from	 the	 customer,	 prior	 to	
solicitation, regarding whether or not the customer is willing to be solicited.
(iii) Commodity Derivatives Act 62）
 The purpose of this Act is to ensure fairness in the price formation, buying and selling, 
and other transactions in connection with commodities and in the acceptance of 
consignment of transactions, etc. on commodity markets, etc. and to facilitate the 
production and distribution of commodities by ensuring the sound management of 
commodity exchanges, ensuring the proper management of the business of persons who 
operate commodity derivatives business and by achieving other conditions through making 
stipulations about the organization of commodity exchanges, management of transactions 
the Regulation of Unrequested Solicitation in the Act on Specified Commercial Transactions], (op.cit. at note 
17),	p.30	ff.
61） Act No.25 of April 13, 1948.
62） Act No.239 of August 5, 1950. Regarding the regulation of unrequested solicitation by this Act, see 
Shinichiro Kato, Shohinsakimonotorihiki ni okeru Fushoseikanyu no Kaikin ni tomonau Jitsumutaio [Practical 
Measures following the Removal of the Ban on Unrequested Solicitation for Commodity Derivatives 
Transactions],	Gendaishohishaho,	no.28	(2015),	p.75	ff.
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on commodity markets and other matters, thereby contributing to the sound development 
of the national economy and to the protection of customers, etc. of consignment of 
transactions and other on commodity markets, etc. (Art. 1).
 According to Art. 214 (vii) and (ix) of the Act, a commodity derivatives business 
operator shall not commit any of the following acts: (vii) carrying out solicitation with 
regard	to	a	commodity	transactions	contract	without	confirming	in	advance	whether	or	not	
a customer has any desire to receive such solicitation after telling such customer the trade 
name or name of the commodity derivatives business operator and the fact that it is a 
solicitation for a conclusion of a commodity transactions contract; (ix) the act of visiting 
or making a telephone call to a customer who has not requested solicitation of conclusion 
of a commodity transaction contract (limited to those designated by cabinet order, by 
taking into consideration the contents of the relevant commodity transaction contract and 
other circumstances concerned, contracts for which protection of customers, etc. is 
particularly necessary), thereby soliciting him/her to conclude a commodity transaction 
contract	 (excluding	 acts	 specified	 by	 an	 ordinance	 of	 the	 competent	ministry	 to	 be	 those	
that are not lacking in protection of customers, etc. or that are not likely to harm the 
fairness of transactions).
	 Although,	 at	 first	 sight,	 this	 Act	 seems	 to	 be	 providing	 for	 a	 total	 prohibition	 of	
unrequested telephone and door-to-door solicitation, according to the Ordinance for 
Enforcement of the Commodity Derivatives Act 63）, as in force after its amendment in 
2015, certain solicitations aiming at persons of under 65 years of age and with a certain 
annual income are allowed, from the viewpoint of an activation of the relevant market, on 
condition that a consideration period after the conclusion of the contract will be allowed 
etc. This amendment has been the object of criticism, as being contrary to the purport of 
the authorization by the Act 64）.
B. Ordinances
 As presented above, the Acts currently in force in Japan do not provide for a system 
allowing consumers to refuse unrequested solicitation comprehensively and in advance. 
However,	 there	 exist	 consumer	 affairs	 ordinances	 stipulated	 by	 local	 authorities,	 which	
provide for similar systems. Such ordinances stipulate that in cases where consumers have 
previously expressed their intention to refuse solicitation, before receiving such 
solicitation, acts of businesses that ignore such intentions are treated as “unfair 
commercial practices” and therefore prohibited 65）.
 In general, there are two main types of ordinances dealing with the issue of the refusal 
63） Ordinance of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry No.3 of February 22, 2005.
64） Shinichiro Kato (op.cit. at note 62), p.75.
65） An overview of the relevant ordinance provisions gives the strong impression that their content shows many 
similarities to that of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC.
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of	solicitation,	namely	(i)	ordinances	giving	effect	 to	ex post refusals of solicitations only, 
and	(ii)	ordinances	giving	effects	to	ex ante refusals too 66）.
(i)	 Ordinances	Giving	Effect	Only	to	Ex Post Refusals
 Ordinances belonging to this category provide that in cases where the consumer has 
expressed its will to refuse solicitation, further continuing to solicit or re-soliciting is 
regarded as being an “unfair commercial practice” and therefore not allowed 67）. The 
content of the regulation provided by such ordinances is almost the same as that provided 
by	the	Act	on	Specified	Commercial	Practices.
(ii)	Ordinances	Giving	Effect	to	Ex Ante Refusals
 Ordinances belonging to this category prohibit solicitation against consumers who have 
previously refused such solicitation as being an “unfair commercial practice,” providing 
higher	protection	compared	to	that	of	the	Act	on	Specified	Commercial	Transactions 68）.
 An important issue in cases of ordinances of this category is the concrete means to be 
used for expressing the consumer’s refusal against unrequested solicitation. It is 
noteworthy in this context that part of the ordinances of this category refer to the usage of 
paper	patches	or	stickers	as	examples,	and	give	legal	effect	to	such	usage 69）. Further, some 
66）	 Regarding	 the	 classification	 mentioned	 in	 the	 following	 and	 concrete	 examples	 of	 such	 ordinances,	 see	
Yoshinori Matsuo, Nihon ni okeru Homonkanyuhanbai no Jizenkyohi to Chihojichitai no Torikumi [Ex Ante 
Refusal of Door-to-Door Solicitation and Initiatives of Local Authorities in Japan], Webuban Kokuminseikatsu, 
no.48	(2016),	p.16	ff.
67） For example, the Criteria for Unfair Commercial Practices stipulated by the Mayor of Nagoya, which 
provide details for unfair commercial practices according to Art. 16 para. 3 of the Nagoya City Consumer 
Affairs	 Safety	 Ordinance,	 stipulate	 that	 re-soliciting	 the	 conclusion	 of	 a	 contract	 against	 or	 concluding	 a	
contract with a consumer who has expressed its will of refusal is an unfair commercial practice (and therefore 
prohibited by Art. 16 para. 1 (i) of the Ordinance). The content of the Criteria and the Ordinance (in Japanese) 
can	be	downloaded	from	the	website	of	the	Nagoya	City	Consumer	Affairs	Center,	https://www.seikatsu.city.
nagoya.jp/app/webroot/plaza/gaiyou/ (last visited September 30, 2016).
68）	 For	example,	at	a	prefectural	level,	Art.	15	(i)	of	the	Kyoto	Prefecture	Consumer	Affairs	Safety	Ordinance,	
which can be downloaded (in Japanese) from the website of the Prefecture, http://www.pref.kyoto.jp/
shohise/1175083751318.html (last visited September 30, 2016), provides that soliciting the conclusion of a 
contract against a consumer against its will of refusal is prohibited as being an unfair commercial practice. 
Further, at a municipal level, Annex no.9 (12-2) of the Enforcement Regulations to the Ordinance for the 
Protection of Life of Kobe Citizens, related to Art. 14 of the same Enforcement Regulations, which provides 
details for Art. 23 of the Ordinance for the Protection of Life of Kobe Citizens, stipulates that soliciting the 
conclusion of a contract against consumers who have made clear the lack of will to conclude a contract related 
to door-to-door or telephone solicitation is prohibited as being an unfair commercial practice. The content of 
the Kobe City Ordinance and Enforcement Regulations (in Japanese) can be downloaded from the City’s 
website, http://www.city.kobe.lg.jp/life/livelihood/lifestyle/kurashijyourei/index.html (last visited September 
30, 2016).
69）	 For	 example,	 the	 Enforcement	 Regulations	 to	 the	 Hokkaido	 Prefecture	 Ordinance	 for	 Consumer	Affairs	
provide in no.4 of their Annex (related to Art. 3-2 of the Enforcement Regulations), which stipulates details 
for	Art.	16,	para.	1	 (iv)	of	 the	Hokkaido	Prefecture	Consumer	Affairs	Ordinance,	 that	soliciting	a	consumer	
to conclude a contract although the consumer has expressed its refusal to be solicited is prohibited as being 
an unfair commercial practice. Further, the “Purport/Explication of Words/Related Laws and Regulations/
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local authorities have even prepared and deliver stickers for this purpose 70）.
 The systems where ordinances grant stickers etc. that are recognized as legally 
effective	refusals	are	similar	 to	 those	of	 the	U.S.	or	Australia	mentioned	above.	However,	
a view at the consequences of breaches of the will expressed by such stickers etc. in 
Japan gives only poor results. Most of the local authority ordinances provide only for 
investigations, administrative guidance, adjurations, or publications of the businesses in 
breach, and no stricter sanctions (e.g. cessation of business, penalties, invalidity of the 
contracts concluded as a result etc.) can be found 71）.
2. Regulation by Other Means
A.Technical Solutions Against Cold Calling
 Due to the shortcomings in the legislative regulation of cold calling in Japan as seen 
above under 1., technical devices that enable dealing with such calls as well as with fraud 
calls have been developed and have started spreading in Japan. There are mainly two 
types of such devices: conversation recording type and refusal of incoming calls type.
 In the case of the former type, the content of the conversations is automatically 
recorded, after having played a message that warns the caller that such recording will be 
performed. Various such devices are currently sold in the market. From 2013, the 
Metropolitan Police Department has lent 15,000 devices in the metropolitan area of 
Tokyo 72） as part of countermeasures against remittance frauds (bank transfer scams)73）. 
Further,	 from	 September	 2013,	 the	 Consumer	 Affairs	 Agency	 lent	 such	 devices	 to	 238	
Application Examples for Unfair Commercial Practices Based on the Provisions of Article 16 Paragraph 1 of 
the	Hokkaido	Prefecture	Consumer	Affairs	Ordinance	 (Hokkaido	Prefecture	Environmental	and	Community	
Affairs	Department,	Life	Safety	Bureau,	Consumer	Safety	Division)”	expressly	mentions	(in	page	26)	that	the	
expression of refusal of solicitations of the above-mentioned provisions can be made either orally or in 
writing, and that the usage of stickers at the entrance of houses or apartments expressing such refusal is 
understood as expression of the will of all residents of such houses or apartments. The content of the 
Ordinance can be found at http://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/ks/sak/kaisei-shohijourei.htm, the content of the 
Enforcement Regulations at http://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/ks/sak/kisoku.htm, and the content of the 
Explications etc. at http://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/ks/sak/grp/chikujou.pdf (all websites of the Prefecture, in 
Japanese, last visited September 30, 2016).
70） For example, Otaru City in Hokkaido Prefecture has prepared and delivers a sticker mentioning that 
soliciting in spite of the usage of the sticker is a violation of the City Ordinance. See Yoshinori Matsuo (op. 
cit. at note 66), p.17.
71） Ibid. The same author also shows concern about the fact that even the investigations and administrative 
guidance etc. procedures provided are very rarely used by the local authorities.
72） Shinji Minai (op. cit. at note 5), p.17. 
73） The so-called “Furikomesagi” in Japanese. Regarding the spreading of such frauds in the Japanese society, 
see	for	example	the	article	“Remittance	fraud	cases	set	new	record	in	first	10	months	of	2014”	published	on	
the website of The Japan Times News on December 1, 2014, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2014/12/01/national/crime-legal/remittance-fraud-cases-set-new-record-in-first-10-months-of-2014/#.V_
xSqCQWTcM (last visited September 30, 2016).
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households	 in	five	areas	within	 Iwate,	Chiba,	and	Oita	prefectures,	 in	 the	 framework	of	a	
“Model Work for the Prevention of Secondary Damage Caused to Elderly Consumers” 
implemented	 for	 five	 months	 from	 the	 end	 of	 September	 2013	 to	 the	 end	 of	 February	
201474）. Such lending is also performed in many other prefectures throughout Japan 75）.
 Further, in the case of the latter type, the telephone numbers from which nuisance calls 
are performed are consolidated and registered in the form of a “blacklist”; the devices 
automatically recognize calls from such numbers and either block such incoming calls, or 
warn the receiver using warning lights 76）. Such devices can be either installed separately 
from the telephone device, or are integrated with the telephone device, and are available 
for mobile phones as well. The information on the telephone numbers from which 
nuisance calls are performed is gathered from information provided by the police, and also 
by accumulation of registration information provided by users of such devices 77）. A basic 
fee is charged for this service, but free lending of such devices has been performed by 
many local authorities or police departments throughout Japan 78）. In view of the fact that 
such	 devices	 have	 been	 demonstrating	 a	 certain	 effect,	 the	Consumer	Affairs	Agency	 has	
prepared a “Manual for the Introduction of Prevention Countermeasures against Damage 
from Malicious Telephone Solicitation of Elderly Consumers,” considering and analyzing 
actual examples of usage of such devices. This manual was distributed to local authorities 
with the aim of increasing the usage of such devices 79）.
B. Do-Not-Knock Stickers
 As mentioned above in Section 1. B., there exist local authorities with ordinances that 
grant	Do-Not-Knock	stickers	a	certain	 legal	effect.	At	 the	same	 time,	 there	are	also	many	
local authorities that prepare and deliver Do-Not-Knock stickers in order to prevent 
consumer damage arising from door-to-door solicitation, regardless of the fact that no 
legal	effect	is	granted	to	them	by	the	ordinances 80）.
	 As	already	mentioned,	according	to	the	understanding	of	the	Consumer	Affairs	Agency,	
74）	 White	Paper	on	Consumer	Affairs	2014	(hereinafter	referred	to	as	the	“White	Paper”),	p.204	ff.	The	content	
of	the	White	Paper	(in	Japanese)	can	be	downloaded	from	the	website	of	the	Consumer	Affairs	Agency,	http://
www.caa.go.jp/adjustments/index_15.html (last visited September 30, 2016). According to the Paper, devices 
with such warning messages reduce the number of malicious calls to around one tenth, and in a questionnaire, 
96% of the users answered that they felt safe.
75） For details see Shinji Minai (op. cit. at note 5), p.18.
76） For example, according to the image no.5-2-8 presented in the White Paper, p.206, a call coming from a 
number registered as a nuisance call number would be indicated by a red light, a call from an unregistered 
number by a yellow light, and a call from a number previously authorized by the receiver by a blue light.
77） See for example the information provided about such devices (in Japanese) on the website of Fukuoka 
Prefecture, http://www.pref.fukuoka.lg.jp/contents/rokuon-souchi.html (last visited September 30, 2016).
78） Shinji Minai (op. cit. at note 5), p.18.
79） White Paper, p.206.
80） Yoshinori Matsuo (op. cit. at note 66), p.18.
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such stickers do not meet the requirements of the refusal of solicitation under the 
prohibition	of	re-solicitation	as	provided	in	the	Act	on	Specified	Commercial	Transactions.	
However,	 according	 to	 an	 official	 statement	 of	 the	 same	Agency,	 stickers	 prepared	 and	
delivered by local authorities, as well as those prepared by consumers, regardless of 
whether	 they	are	granted	with	 legal	effects	by	 the	ordinances	or	not,	“are	effective	means	
for	 the	 prevention	 of	 consumer	 troubles	 in	 local	 areas,	 are	 not	 affected	 at	 all	 by	 the	
above-mentioned	 interpretation	 of	 the	 provision	 of	 the	 Act	 on	 Specified	 Commercial	
Transactions prohibiting re-solicitation, and mutually supplement with the Act on 
Specified	Commercial	Transactions.”	Further,	“In	cases	where	there	exist	patches	of	paper,	
seals etc., businesses should, as ethics of business, naturally respect such will of 
consumers” 81）.
3.	Issues	with	the	Current	State	of	Affairs	of	Regulation
 In Japan, there exists data that demonstrates consumers’ abhorrence of unrequested 
solicitations. According to the results of a “Consumer Attitude Survey on Door-to-Door 
Solicitation, Telephone Solicitation and Fax Solicitation” 82） conducted in 2014, among 
2000 consumers who replied, the rate of those who “totally do not want” to be solicited 
was 96.2% for door-to-door solicitation and 96.4% for telephone solicitation.
 Why are consumers (apparently, not only in Japan) so against unrequested solicitation? 
The main issues that are pointed out as problems of unrequested solicitation are the 
following: (1) a solicitation lacking previous consent is a nuisance in itself, (2) such 
solicitation can easily become a hotbed of malicious business methods, since consumers 
usually	are	not	interested	in	the	relevant	products	or	services	and	do	not	possess	sufficient	
information about them (the element of “surprise” characterizing such solicitation is also 
emphasized), (3) there are occasions where such solicitation targets consumers with issues 
regarding their judgment capacity, e.g. persons with mental diseases such as Alzheimer’s 
disease, people who cannot easily refuse due to their character, and (4) such solicitation 
often targets consumers who lack payment capacity, resulting in contracts exceeding such 
capacity or contracts for quantities that considerably exceed what is normally required 
81）	 “Regarding	the	Provision	Prohibiting	Re-Solicitation	in	the	Act	on	Specified	Commercial	Transactions	and	
‘Do-Not-Knock	 Patches	 of	 Paper/Seals	 etc.’”	 published	 by	 the	 Consumer	 Affairs	 Agency,	 Commercial	
Business and Price Regulation Division on December 10, 2009. Its content (in Japanese) can be downloaded 
from	the	website	of	the	Consumer	Affairs	Agency,	http://www.caa.go.jp/policies/policy/consumer_transaction/
release/ (last visited September 30, 2016).
82）	 The	 results	 of	 this	 survey	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Shohishacho	 [Consumer	 Affairs	 Agency],	 Heisei 26nendo 
Shohishaseisaku no Jissijokyo [Implementation Status of Consumer Policy in 2014], p.84, chart 2-2-6. 
 This document (in Japanese) can be downloaded from http://www.caa.go.jp/adjustments/pdf/27hakusho_
honbun.pdf#search=%27%E5%B9%B3%E6%88%9026%E5%B9%B4%E5%BA%A6%E6%B6%88%E8%B
2%BB%E8%80%85%E6%94%BF%E7%AD%96%E3%81%AE%E5%AE%9F%E6%96%BD%E7%8A%B6
%E6%B3%81%27 (last visited September 30, 2016).
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being	concluded,	sometimes	severely	affecting	the	economic	life	of	consumers 83）.
 In view of the above, in Japan, the necessity of the introduction of an opt-in or opt-out 
system regarding unrequested telephone and door-to-door solicitation has been debated for 
many years. The relevant debate has been quite detailed and refers to many aspects. In the 
following, only an overview of the main grounds referred to by the doctrine in favor of 
the introduction of a regulation system in Japan, as well as the main grounds for 
oppositions will be presented.
 The main reasons forming the basis of the opinion in favor of the introduction of such 
a system have been the following: (1) the necessity for protection of the tranquility of life/
of the right to privacy (here, the necessity to respect the consumer’s wish not to be 
solicited from the beginning, namely, not only after solicitation has started, but even 
before that is emphasized), (2) the necessity to protect and support autonomic decision-
making, (3) the lack of information on the part of consumers (discrepancy of information 
between businesses and consumers), (4) the possibility of infringement of the consumers’ 
right to life (in relation to the so-called “suitability rule”), (5) the necessity to achieve the 
purpose	 of	 each	 industry	 law	 (in	 case	 such	 regulation	 is	 to	 be	 introduced	 in	 specific	
industry laws), and (6) the function of such regulation as a rule for fair competition 84）.
 On the other hand, businesses strongly oppose the introduction of such regulation. 
More	 specifically,	 according	 to	 the	 opinions	 of	 business	 representatives	 expressed	 at	 a	
hearing of the Expert Examination Committee (hereinafter also referred to as the 
“Committee”)85） established within the Consumer Commission, during the preparatory 
procedure	for	 the	review	of	 the	Act	on	Specified	Commercial	Transactions	(which	will	be	
presented below in Chapter IV), businesses seem not to be opposing the strengthening of 
regulation against malicious telephone and door-to-door solicitation businesses. However, 
businesses seem to be strongly against a general regulation of such solicitations. 
Regarding door-to-door solicitation, the main reasons are two-fold: (1) More than 80% of 
employees	 performing	 door-to-door	 solicitation	 are	 women.	 This	 field	 has	 been	 offering	
employment to elderly people and women, and a large part of them will lose their jobs; 
(2) A comprehensive regulation would restrict consumers’ opportunities to choose among 
83） Makinori Goto (op. cit. at note 1), p.38.
84）	 Regarding	such	justifications	for	the	introduction	of	a	regulation	system,	see	id.	at	p.41	ff.,	Yutaka	Ishitoya,	
Fushoseikanyukisei no Hokisei no Genjo to Kadai [Current State and Issues of Legal Regulation of 
Unrequested Solicitation],	Gendaishohishaho,	 no.9	 (2010),	 p.10	ff.,	 Shinji	Minai,	Do-Not-Call Seido to wa 
[What is the Do-Not-Call System?],	Webuban	Kokuminseikatsu,	no.35	(2015),	p.16	ff.
85） The Committee was presided by Professor Makinori Goto (Waseda University), and consisted of 15 
members with various backgrounds (university professors, lawyers, board members of business or consumer 
organizations etc.). The member list of the Committee as well as details of the works performed and reports 
published	by	the	Committee	can	be	found	(in	Japanese)	on	the	website	of	the	Cabinet	Office,	http://www.cao.
go.jp/consumer/kabusoshiki/tokusho/ (last visited September 30, 2016). The author of this paper was invited 
to participate as an observer to the 6th meeting of the Committee, where the hearings of business representatives 
were held.
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various products, and result in consumers losing convenience 86）.
 Under the current state of legislation, as presented above in Section 1, existing 
provisions prohibit solicitations of consumers who have not requested such solicitations 
regarding transactions that fall within the scope of the Financial Instruments and 
Exchange Act and Commodity Derivatives Act, as well as for door-to-door purchases. 
These prohibitions provide for an opt-in regulation.
 On the contrary, regarding transactions that are not included in the scope of the above-
mentioned provisions, there is no such prohibition of unrequested solicitation. Art. 3-2, 
para.	1	of	the	Act	on	Specified	Commercial	Transactions	provides	that	“When	a	seller	or	a	
Service	 Provider	 seeks	 to	 conduct	 Door-to-Door	 Sales,	 he/she	 shall	 endeavor	 to	 confirm	
that the counterparty is willing to be solicited,” imposing on the businesses an “obligation 
to	 make	 effort”	 to	 confirm	 the	 consumer’s	 will	 to	 be	 solicited	 before	 starting	 such	
solicitation for door-to-door sales. Regarding telephone solicitations, not even such an 
“obligation	to	make	effort”	is	provided	for.
	 The	understanding	of	 the	Consumer	Affairs	Agency	 regarding	Art.	3-2	para.	2	of	 the	
Act	 on	 Specified	 Commercial	 Transactions	 which	 is	 strongly	 relevant	 for	 door-to-door	
solicitation has been strongly criticized, since it does not allow for a prevention of 
consumer	damage	caused	by	such	solicitation,	as	it	requires	consumers	to	first	be	exposed	
to	solicitation,	before	refusing	it.	Further,	it	has	been	pointed	out	that	the	efforts	to	diffuse	
the usage of Do-Not-Knock stickers etc. are still limited in few local authorities, and that 
given	 the	weak	nature	of	 the	sanctions	stipulated,	 the	preventing	effect	of	such	stickers	 is	
considerably	 insufficient.	 According	 to	 this	 opinion,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 (1)	 promote	 the	
establishment of ordinances which treat solicitations contrary to the previously expressed 
refusal of consumer as being prohibited unfair commercial practices, (2) grant with 
ordinances	 legal	 effects	 to	 Do-Not-Knock	 stickers	 as	 a	 means	 of	 expression	 of	 such	
refusal,	 and	 (3)	 provide	 in	 ordinances	 effective	 sanctions	 (both	 administrative	 and	 penal	
sanctions) against businesses performing door-to-door solicitation in breach of such 
wishes 87）.
	 Regarding	 the	 development	 and	 diffusion	 of	 technical	 devices	 against	 telephone	
solicitation, it cannot be denied that such devices could contribute to the protection of 
consumers, especially of the so-called “vulnerable consumers”, from malicious telephone 
solicitation, including unrequested telephone solicitation. However, it must also be pointed 
out that such devices do not provide a comprehensive protection of the consumer’s will 
not to receive unrequested telephone solicitation. The author strongly agrees with the 
86） See for example the material submitted during the 1st meeting of the Committee by the Japan Direct Selling 
Association, the Japan Direct Marketing Association and the Vice-President (then) of the Japan Direct Selling 
Association	 and	member	 of	 the	 Committee,	 Hiroki	 Suzuki,	 available	 at	 the	website	 of	 the	 Cabinet	 Office,	
http://www.cao.go.jp/consumer/history/03/kabusoshiki/tokusho/senmon/001/shiryou/index.html (last visited 
September 30, 2016).
87） Yoshinori Matsuo (op. cit. at note 66), p.18.
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opinion expressed in the above-presented Mainstream Marketing Services Decision of the 
Supreme Court of the U.S., that “[e]ach of these alternatives puts the cost of avoiding 
unwanted	telemarketing	calls	on	consumers,”	and	that	“[f ]orcing	consumers	to	compete	in	
a	 technological	 arms	 race	 with	 the	 telemarketing	 industry	 is	 not	 an	 equally	 effective	
alternative to the do-not-call registry.”
 Thus, under the current state of legislative regulation in Japan, although there are some 
transaction types where solicitation is prohibited once the consumer has expressed its 
refusal against such solicitation after it has begun, no comprehensive right of consumers to 
refuse all unrequested solicitation beforehand has been established. On the other hand, 
although	 it	cannot	be	denied	 that	 the	existing	non-legislative	means	offer	a	certain	degree	
of	 support	 to	 consumers,	 their	 efficiency	 depends	 on	 the	 specific	 circumstances	 of	 each	
case and sometimes leads to a “race” between consumers who attempt to protect 
themselves and businesses who try to circumvent such means.
 Taking into consideration the above, it could be pointed out that Japanese legislation 
has fallen behind compared to that of most (regarding telephone solicitation) and many 
(regarding door-to-door solicitation) countries abroad, regarding the provision to the 
persons to be solicited of the ability to comprehensively refuse all future unrequested 
telephone and/or door-to-door solicitations.
IV. Deliberations within the Expert Examination Committee
	 The	 above-mentioned	 Act	 on	 Specified	 Commercial	 Transactions,	 which	 was	
established in 1976, has undergone a few amendments, with the most recent and 
significant	 being	 that	 of	 2008.	 Art.8	 of	 Act	 No.74	 of	 June	 18,	 2008,	 by	 which	 this	
amendment	 was	 carried,	 provided	 for	 a	 review	 of	 the	 Act	 on	 Specified	 Commercial	
Transactions	after	the	lapse	of	a	period	of	five	years	after	the	amendment.
 In January 2015, the Prime Minister consulted with the Consumer Commission of the 
Cabinet	 Office	 for	 a	 revision	 of	 the	 Act	 on	 Specified	 Commercial	 Transactions.	 From	
March 2015, the Committee began to reconsider the provisions of the same Act, in order 
to ensure that it corresponds to the social changes etc. that had taken place after the 
above-mentioned amendment in 2008. In August 2015, the Committee published an 
Intermediate Report, and in December of the same year a Final Report 88）.
 During this procedure, the introduction of provisions regarding unrequested telephone 
and door-to-door solicitation was also deliberated.
 Before this procedure, the relevant debate regarding unrequested telephone solicitation 
has been focusing on the necessity or not of the introduction of an opt-out system for 
88）	 The	Intermediate	and	Final	Report	 (in	Japanese)	are	available	at	 the	website	of	 the	Cabinet	Office,	www.
cao.go.jp/consumer/kabusoshiki/tokusho/ (last visited September 30, 2016).
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investment transactions 89）, which have been regarded as being the most problematic in this 
aspect as already mentioned. However, the necessity of introducing a Do-Not-Call system 
was also considered during the 22nd meeting (held on July 2, 2009) of the Committee on 
Economy, Trade and Industry of the National Diet 90）. Further, local authorities 91） and bar 
associations 92） have been expressing opinions and making suggestions about an 
introduction of a system against telephone and door-to-door solicitation 93）. It must be also 
pointed out that voluntary systems of a similar nature, such as the “Telephone Preference 
Service” run by the Call Center Association of Japan (CCAJ, former Telemarketing 
Association of Japan), have existed between 2003 and 2006.
 In the following, the content of the Intermediate Report and the Final Report regarding 
telephone and door-to-door solicitation will be analyzed (sections 1 and 2 respectively).
1. Intermediate Report
 The Intermediate Report mentions that during the Committee Deliberations, the 
opinion that despite the introduction of the already mentioned prohibition of re-solicitation 
89） Shinji Minai (op. cit. at note 5), p.19.
90） According to the website of the House of Councilors of the National Diet of Japan, http://www.sangiin.
go.jp/japanese/kaigijoho/shitsugi/171/s071_0702.html (last visited September 30, 2016), among the questions 
raised during the same meeting, was that of “The necessity of introducing also in Japan the system of the 
United States where telephone numbers of those not willing to receive nuisance telephone solicitation are 
registered.”
91） See for example the “Opinion Paper Requesting for an Introduction of a System Allowing Consumers to 
Previously Refuse Undesirous Solicitation,” adopted by the Osaka Prefectural Assembly on October 27, 2015, 
which can be accessed (in Japanese) on the website of the Prefecture, http://www.pref.osaka.lg.jp/gikai_somu/
h2709/1027tokutei.html (last visited September 30, 2016).
92） In Japan, there is the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/ (last visited 
on September 30, 2016), which is the nationwide lawyers’ organization, eight regional federations of bar 
associations in the districts of jurisdiction of each high court, and 52 bar associations.
93） See for example the “Opinion Paper Regarding the ‘Consumer Basic Plan’”, adopted by the Japan 
Federation of Bar Associations on January 21, 2010, which can be downloaded (in Japanese) from the website 
of the Federation, http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/activity/document/opinion/year/2010/100121.html (last visited 
September	 30,	 2016),	 and	 the	 “Opinion	 Paper	 Requesting	 for	 the	 Introduction	 into	 the	Act	 on	 Specified	
Commercial Transactions of a System Prohibiting Solicitation against Persons who have previously refused” 
adopted on July 17, 2015 by the same Federation, which can be downloaded (in Japanese) also from the 
website of the Federation, http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/activity/document/opinion/year/2015/150717_2.html 
(last visited September 30, 2016). The latter opinion paper, (1) requests for an immediate introduction of a 
Do-Not-Call and a Do-Not-Knock System, and suggests (2) that the checking of the existence or not of 
Do-Not-Call registrations (with charge for the businesses) should be done with a “washing” of the lists of 
persons to be solicited submitted by the businesses, by the State which should be in charge of administrating 
the registrations (which should be performed free of charge), (3) that regarding the Do-Not-Knock system, 
stickers, registries or a combination of both should be used, and the same above under (2) should apply, and 
(4)	 that	 the	exemptions	provided	 in	Art.	26,	para.	1	 (viii)	of	 the	Act	on	Specified	Commercial	Transactions	
should not apply to the prohibition of solicitation to persons who have previously refused, and that the relevant 
provisions must be revised.
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to	 the	 Act	 on	 Specified	 Commercial	 Transactions	 in	 2008,	 the	 number	 of	 complaints	
submitted	 to	 Consumer	 Affairs	 Centers 94） has not declined, showing that the current 
legislation	 is	 not	 effective	 enough	 to	 prevent	 troubles 95）. The concrete means for dealing 
with unrequested solicitation that were presented during deliberations in the Committee 
were Do-Not-Call Stickers, Do-Not-Call and Do-Not-Knock registries, automatic 
telephone responses etc.96）
 The concerns pointed out on behalf of businesses regarding the introduction of 
legislative	measures	against	unrequested	solicitation	were	that	there	is	no	sufficient	factual	
evidence indicating their necessity; that a comprehensive regulation of such commercial 
activities would be equal to their prohibition; that since the current consumer damage is 
actually caused by some dishonest businesses that do not observe the existing legislation, 
it would be possible to deal with the issue by establishing a proper enforcement system; 
and that in cases of small businesses that do not have enough funds for publicities, door-
to-door solicitation is an important means of commercial activity 97）. Thus, businesses 
positioned themselves against the introduction of any regulation other than that currently 
in existence.
 In view of the above, the Intermediate Report concludes that no common 
understanding about the necessity of an enhancement of the relevant regulation has been 
formed among the members of the Committee, and that considerations regarding this issue 
should further continue 98）.
2. Final Report
 The Final Report concludes that no common understanding could be formed among 
the members of the Committee regarding the necessity of an enhancement of the existing 
regulation on door-to-door and telephone solicitation, as well as a review of the 
interpretation	of	Art.	3-2	of	 the	Act	on	Specified	Commercial	Transactions	as	 included	 in	
the	already	mentioned	“Guideline	on	Article	3-2	etc.	of	 the	Act	on	Specified	Commercial	
Transactions” 99）.
 The reasons mentioned in the Final Report for the failure to form such a common 
understanding among the members are that the information regarding relevant consumer 
damage as included in PIO-NET100） is problematic, because the content of complaints etc. 
94） Administrative bodies established by local authorities, which deal with consumer complaints against 
businesses (free of charge), perform information campaigns for consumers etc.
95） Intermediate Report, p.9.
96） Intermediate Report, p.13.
97） Intermediate Report, p.7.
98）	 Intermediate	Report,	p.11	ff.
99） Final report, p.16.
100）  PIO-NET (Practical Living Information Online Network System) is a network system that links the 
National	 Consumer	 Affairs	 Center	 of	 Japan	 (NCAC)	 and	 the	 Consumer	 Affairs	 Centers,	 and	 collects	
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has	 not	 been	 objectively	 classified,	 and	 it	 can	 therefore	 not	 be	 used	 as	 a	 database	
grounding the necessity for legislative action, and that as a result of a public call for the 
submission of opinions about the points-at-issue regarding regulation of unrequested 
solicitation, only 545 opinions were expressed in favor, whereas 39,428 opinions against 
such regulation were submitted 101）.
 A Draft Bill, not including suggestions about the introduction of a system allowing for 
a general ex ante refusal of door-to-door and telephone solicitation, was submitted to the 
Diet	 on	 March	 4,	 2016,	 with	 the	 final	 Bill	 adopted	 on	 May	 25	 of	 the	 same	 year,	 and	
promulgated on June 3. The only new element regarding unrequested solicitation 
introduced by this Bill is the prohibition (opt-in system) of unrequested solicitation by fax 
(an extension of the already existing regulation on e-mails). It will come into force within 
one	year	and	six	months	from	the	day	of	its	promulgation,	and	will	be	revised	within	five	
years from its coming into force. According to the supplementary resolutions of the House 
of Representatives 102） and the House of Councilors 103）, if the necessity arises due to new 
consumer	 damage,	 revision	 will	 be	 made	 earlier	 than	 five	 years.	 Further,	 if	 damage	 to	
elderly people etc. continues to occur, strengthening the regulation will also be considered 
(the supplementary resolution of the House of Councilors mentions that such 
strengthening will take place also “taking into consideration initiatives taken in foreign 
countries”).
V. Closing Remarks: The Way Ahead
 The analysis in this paper has shown the international trends of regulation of telephone 
and door-to-door solicitation, the current state of and issues regarding such regulation, as 
well	 as	 the	 most	 recent	 developments	 in	 this	 field.	 In	 this	 closing	 chapter,	 the	 author	
would like to make some remarks regarding the way ahead in Japan.
	 Regarding	telephone	solicitation,	it	seems	difficult	for	businesses	to	continue	resisting	
the introduction of a Do-Not-Call system in the future. The international trends clearly 
information	about	consumer	complaints	submitted	to	Consumer	Affairs	Centers.	According	to	the	website	of	
the	National	Consumer	Affairs	Center	 of	 Japan	 (in	 Japanese),	 http://www.kokusen.go.jp/pionet/	 (last	 visited	
September 30, 2016), as of April 1, 2016, there exist 3,262 PIO-NET terminal units installed in 785 locations 
(Consumer	Affairs	Centers)	throughout	Japan.
101）	 Final	Report,	p.15	ff.
102）	 Supplementary	 Resolution	 Regarding	 the	 Draft	 Bill	 Revising	 Part	 of	 the	Act	 on	 Specified	 Commercial	
Transactions, of the Special Committee for Consumer Issues (April 28, 2016), which can be found on the 
website of the House of Representatives, http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_rchome.nsf/html/rchome/
Futai/shohishaA74D4C40873F3AA049257FAF001FD4C7.htm (last visited September 30, 2016).
103）	 Supplementary	 Resolution	 Regarding	 the	 Draft	 Bill	 Revising	 Part	 of	 the	Act	 on	 Specified	 Commercial	
Transactions, of the Special Committee for Provinces/Consumer Issues (May 20, 2016), which can be 
downloaded (in Japanese) from the website of the House of Councilors, http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/
gianjoho/ketsugi/190/futai_ind.html (last visited September 30, 2016).
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show that the existence of at least an opt-out system is necessary. The lack of such a 
system in Japan could possibly place barriers on Japan’s enhancement of international 
competitiveness, in view of the existence of such systems in the main markets of the 
Asian region.
 On the other hand, the introduction of a legislation providing for an opt-out or opt-in 
regulation	 system	 for	 door-to-door	 solicitation	 seems	 to	 be	 difficult	 under	 the	 current	
circumstances, one reason being that Do-Not-Knock systems are introduced only in a few 
countries, as shown in this paper. The author’s opinion is that this has also to do with 
differences	 in	 the	 market	 composition	 of	 each	 country,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 some	
countries, for examples in EU member states, a certain degree of protection is assured by 
means of a regulation of unfair commercial practices in general. This would in any case 
need separate and detailed consideration in another paper.
 However, it seems that local authority ordinances in Japan have been really productive 
in	 this	field,	pushing	ahead	despite	 the	 reluctant	position	of	 the	Japanese	government	and	
of	the	agency	in	charge.	The	diffusion	of	such	ordinances	in	many	local	authorities	seems	
to be possible, and would lead to a similar situation to that of a Do-Not-Knock system 
provided by nationwide legislation. Needless to say, if such ordinances would be 
established in most (or all) local authorities and actually used by the vast majority of 
consumers, this would lead to the de facto existence of an opt-in regulation. It must be also 
emphasized	that	such	a	development	could	make	Japan	a	pioneer	in	this	field.
	 The	 author	believes	 that	 despite	 the	 recent	 legislative	developments	 in	 this	field,	 the	
supplementary resolutions of both Houses of the Japanese Diet show a certain degree of 
understanding and willingness to embrace the introduction of new systems for consumer 
protection.	Future	debates	and	developments	 in	 this	field	 in	Japan	are	certainly	worthy	of	
attention.
